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 National Identity and International Politics 
An Analysis of Romania’s Post-Communist  
Foreign Policy Imaginary (1990-1996) 
 




The concept of “identity” with its various nuances has been intensely 
analysed in academia, shedding distinctive light on the way we think about a 
state’s external affairs. Post-1990 the gradual restoration of democracy provided 
Romania with the opportunity to freely choose a new international direction. 
Following the collapse of the communist dictatorship in December 1989, 
Romanian foreign policy featured two major goals that marked the evolution of 
national identity – membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and in the European Union (EU). Euro-Atlantic accession was partly a 
rational foreign policy choice because it would bring material advantages such 
as increased security and economic prosperity. Nevertheless, NATO and EU 
integration primarily meant for Romania the return to the Western world from 
which it had been separated by communism and the irrevocable recognition of 
its proclaimed Euro-Atlantic identity. Joining the Euro-Atlantic community was 
a necessary step since a state’s national identity becomes valid only in so far as 
it is legitimated at both the domestic and international level. 
In line with such an argument, this article aims to configure an inter-
disciplinary perspective of national identity and to illustrate it by analysing 
Romania’s post-communist foreign policy imaginary, which emerged in 1990-
1996. The working framework of national identity draws insights related to four 
literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and 
international recognition. They have a complementary utility in identifying the 
elements that shape the dual dynamic of national identity ‒ internal (the nation 
and collective memory-myths) and external (recognition by relevant others). As 
an empirical application, the years 1990-1996 constitute an important case study 
since they were one of the key formative periods of Romania’s post-communist 
identity and exhibited a bewildering array of emerging and re-emerging ideas. 
The foreign policy imaginary articulated three main discursive themes or self-
images: “European”, “non-Balkan” and “security provider”. These self-images 
feeding into national identity formed an ideational foundation that influenced 
how Romania positioned itself in the arena of international politics. In terms of 
structure, the article first introduces the conceptual outline of national identity 
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and then examines the three major identity themes that circulated in the 
Romanian foreign policy imaginary between 1990 and 1996. 
 
 
 An Inter-Disciplinary Perspective on National Identity 
 
The conceptual stance adopted by this article is an inter-disciplinary 
view on national identity, which draws from four academic literatures ‒ 
constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and international 
recognition. It starts from the constructivist principle that identities have an 
ideational basis and fluid nature, being defined and re-defined under the impact 
of systemic and internal factors1. Constructivism in turn represents the 
ontological position which posits that “all knowledge, and therefore all 
meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being 
constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and 
developed and transmitted within an essentially social context”2. When 
discussing the relationship between foreign policy and identity, the foreign 
policy imaginary becomes a key tool derived from Jutta Weldes’ “security 
imaginary” – “a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out 
of which representations of the world of international relations are created”3. 
Both adaptations originate in the “social imaginary” of Cornelius 
Castoriadis, who argues that the symbolic carries understandings that take into 
account the “real-rational”, but also includes an imaginary dimension which 
comes “from the original faculty of positioning or presenting oneself with 
things and relations that do not exist, in the form of representation”4. To put it 
more simply, the foreign policy imaginary enables answers to existential 
questions like “[w]ho are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? 
[...] What do we want […] what are we lacking?”5. It also offers “the cultural 
raw materials out of which representations of states, of relations among states, 
and of the international system are constructed”6. 
For the purpose of this context, the foreign policy imaginary is an 
ideational reservoir, which contains those stable self-images rooted in the 
                                                 
1
  Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, European Journal of International Relations, 
vol. 2, no. 3, 1996, p. 281. 
2
  Michael J. Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the 
Research Process, Sage, London, 2003, p. 42. 
3
  Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999, p. 10. 
4
  Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1987, p. 127. 
5
  Ibidem, p. 146. 
6
  Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests…cit., p. 10. 
National Identity and International Politics 359 
 







nation’s memories of historical past and configuring national identity at present. 
The ideational structure influences how elites think about or perceive 
themselves and the state they represent. It conditions agents to an extent, yet 
they do retain freedom of action and choice. Political actors are conditioned in 
the sense that they operate within the parameters set by the foreign policy 
imaginary. However, the foreign policy imaginary is not a fixed structure and 
has a variety of articulations, which allows decision-makers to modify meanings 
or to select the appropriate ones depending on the circumstances. The concept 
has been inspired by Weldes’ work, but an inter-disciplinary view of identity 
takes things a step further by elucidating the specific factors shaping national 
identity both from within and from outside7. 
Building on Castoriadis’ reasoning, this article argues that the self-
images feeding into national identity may have a “real” (somewhat objectively 
identifiable) core like language and ethnicity, an “imagined” basis or a 
combination of the two categories. In order to explain such a thesis and better 
grasp the domestic sources of Romanian identity, the scholarships on 
nationalism and collective memory play a prominent part. The literature on 
nationalism has examined the first and most obvious internal element of 
national identity – the nation. Benedict Anderson regards nations as an 
“imagined” phenomenon because “the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”8. Even though 
modern nations are constructed, Anthony Smith claims that they have stable 
historical roots in the ethnic groups ‒ “ethnies”, which also provide the shared 
“myths, memories, values and symbols”9 necessary for the formation of national 
identity. The combined insights of Anderson and Smith highlight the imagined 
nature of nations and national identity, which still retain a stable ethno-cultural 
core (ancestry, language, territory, historical myths and memories). While 
discussing the nation’s foundations, scholars of nationalism mention the role of 
historical memory as shared narratives and symbols, yet without going into 
sufficient detail as to how they impact national identity from within10. 
This brings forward the second domestic source of national identity – 
collective memory-myths. Broadly defined, collective memory constitutes “how 
members of society remember and interpret events, how the meaning of the past 
                                                 
7
  Loretta C. Sălăjan, The Role of National Identity in the Trajectory of Romania’s Foreign 
Policy (1990-2007), Doctoral thesis, Aberystwyth University, 2015, p. 57. 
8
  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism, Verso, London, 2006, p. 6. 
9
  Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, p. 15.  
10
  Loretta C. Sălăjan, The Role of National Identity…cit., p. 63. 
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is constructed, and how it is modified over time”11. It can be described as “a 
powerful cohesive force, binding the disparate members of a nation together”, 
drawing boundaries between the self and others and being “transmitted across 
multiple historical contexts”12. When analysing the link between memory and 
national identity, Duncan Bell cautions against the widespread “running 
together (and even conflation) of memory and mythology”13. The national 
identity perspective used in this article acknowledges that there is a 
mythological dimension to the historical narratives passed as collective 
memories from generation to generation in the nation’s evolution. That is why 
the term “collective memory-myths” is preferable here, serving to anchor 
people’s identities into an overarching national identity across many contexts of 
understanding and belonging. To summarise thus far, national identity is an 
ideational construct with two key internal sources: a stable ethno-cultural core 
and enduring collective memory-myths, from which perpetuated self-images of 
the nation draw meaning. 
However, a multi-faceted view of national identity would be incomplete 
without considering the latter’s external dynamic – international recognition. A 
state’s national identity does not circulate in a social vacuum and is highly 
dependent on whether other actors like fellow states accept it or not. Otherwise, 
that identity simply does not exist as a social construct in bilateral or multi-
lateral state interactions. After all, “not only physical, but also social survival is 
at stake” in international politics14. Social survival in the international system 
means having a stable national identity, which is not contested by others. 
Recognition can be defined as “a social act that ascribes to a state some positive 
status, whereby its identity is acknowledged and reinforced as meaningful by a 
significant Other, and thus the state is constituted as a subject with legitimate 
social standing”15. National identity formation is hence understood as an inter-
subjective process of negotiation and dialogue between the self and salient 
others. Since a state has several social positions in the international system, it 
needs to “reflect this differentiation into components” or “multiple selves”16. 
Each of these smaller selves or self-images feeds into an overall national 
identity. The self-image might be called an identity in its own right, but it also 
                                                 
11
  Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National 
Tradition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995, pp. 3-5. 
12
  Duncan Bell, “Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity”, British Journal 
of Sociology, vol. 54, no. 1, 2003, p. 70. 
13
  Ibidem. 
14
  Erik Ringmar, “The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West”, Cooperation 
and Conflict, vol. 37, no. 2, 2002, p. 116. 
15
  Michelle K. Murray, “Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco”, in Thomas 
Lindemann, Erik Ringmar (eds.), The International Politics of Recognition, Paradigm 
Publishers, London, 2011, p. 134. 
16
  Peter J. Burke, Jan E. Stets, Identity Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 10. 
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subsumes hierarchically to a larger identity. Looking at the Romanian case, the 
“Euro-Atlantic” identity is the supreme or overarching national identity. Post-
communist Romania has viewed itself as part of the Euro-Atlantic community 
or Western world, which comprises of two key institutions: NATO and the EU. 
Romania’s “Euro-Atlantic” identity then encompasses three self-images: 
“European”, “non-Balkan” and “security provider”. These are the main themes 
of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary, which were intensely re-articulated 
between 1990 and 1996. 
 
 
 Romania’s “European” Self-Image 
 
Among the three self-images circulating in the Romanian foreign policy 
imaginary, the European one was the most frequently re-defined during 1990-
1996. The main reason is quite simple, as Romanian national identity tends to 
be first associated with a European representation by both elites and the general 
population. Broadly defined, being a “European” state or having a European 
identity refers to being known and accepted as a Western European inspired 
liberal democracy, which upholds two key principles – the organisation of 
regular democratic elections and the protection of human and civil rights and 
liberties. The European self-image was also often subjected to re-definitions 
because it had to simultaneously converse with influential domestic and 
international discourses. This became evident in December 1989, when point 
nine of the statement proposal issued by the National Salvation Front hinted at a 
European direction for Romania: “[T]he country's entire foreign policy is to 
promote good neighbourly relations, friendship and peace in the world, 
integrating itself in the construction process of a united Europe”17. Following 
the first post-communist parliamentary and presidential elections of May 1990, 
at the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in 
November, President Ion Iliescu gave a clear indication of the state's foreign 
policy goals: 
 
 “[T]he new Romania resulting from the Revolution of December 1989 has 
adopted a policy oriented towards re-establishing historical and traditional relations 
with the other countries of Europe and North America, as well as towards developing 
relations with states sharing the same Latin culture and civilisation”18. 
                                                 
17
  The National Salvation Front, “Statement towards the Country”, initially broadcast on the 
national television and radio, then published in Monitorul Oficial al României, no. I (1), 
22 December 1989. 
18
  Ion Iliescu ‒ President of Romania (May 1990-September 1992; September 
1992-November 1996), “Speech at the CSCE Summit” (Paris, 21 November 
1990), in Adevărul, no. I-239, 1990, p. 3. 
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Romania’s second post-communist democratic elections in September 
1992 reconfirmed Iliescu as President and placed the centre-left Social 
Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) in government. Throughout the electoral 
campaign for a new mandate, Iliescu argued that his main vision of the 
country’s external trajectory was “integration into […] the structures 
dominating the European and Euro-Atlantic area”19. The message delivered in 
Parliament by the re-elected President indicated the same foreign policy choice, 
as he stressed that “[Romania's] long-term interests demand, in my opinion, the 
development of privileged relations with the United States, Germany, Great 
Britain, France and with all the other European states”20. The official discourse 
evolved in 1992-1996 towards the recurring representation of NATO and EU 
accession as Romania’s “natural” direction. Teodor Meleşcanu, the new Foreign 
Affairs Minister appointed in November 1992, declared that: “The option of 
Euro-Atlantic integration is a natural choice. It is a well known fact that the 
institutions, the political, cultural and economic life of modern Romania have 
always – with the exception of the Cold War period – been an intrinsic part of 
European civilisation”21. Or as President Iliescu explained in November 1994: 
 
 “[T]he central orientation of Romanian foreign policy is based on the decision 
adopted in the first day of the Romanian revolution and supported, then and now, by all 
political forces in the country – full integration into the political, economic and security 
structures of democratic Europe. This decision was nothing short of natural, considering 
that, through its civilisation, culture, history and geographical position, the Romanian 
nation has always been an inseparable part of European culture and civilisation”22. 
 
In terms of targeted audiences, Romania’s decision-makers were 
addressing such speeches to mostly external recipients. Their messages 
indirectly aimed to remind the Euro-Atlantic community of the “kidnapped, 
displaced West”, the European peoples who had not abandoned their identity 
during communism23. This notion of “natural” choice certainly belied the range 
of foreign policy and security alternatives actually available to post-communist 
Romania and Central-Eastern Europe in general, which included “a reformed 
                                                 
19
  Ion Iliescu, Cred în schimbarea în bine a României, Fundaţia “Dimineaţa”, București, 
1992, p. 12. 
20
  Idem, Address at the Investiture as President of Romania, Fundaţia “Dimineaţa”, 
București, 1992, p. 14. 
21  Teodor Meleşcanu ‒ Minister of Foreign Affairs (November 1992-November 1996), 
“Speech on Romania’s Journey towards Euro-Atlantic Integration” (Athens, July 1996), 
in Renaşterea diplomaţiei româneşti, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2002, p. 144. 
22
  Ion Iliescu, “Speech delivered at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European 
Union” (Paris, 29 November 1994), in Toamna diplomatică/ The Autumn of Diplomacy, 
Redacţia publicaţiilor pentru străinătate, București, 1995, p. 142. 
23
  Milan Kundera, “The Tragedy of Central Europe”, New York Review of Books, vol. 31, 
no. 7, 26 April 1984, p. 2. 
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alliance with the former Soviet Union, neutrality or non-alignment, regional 
security cooperation within Eastern Europe, pan-European collective or 
common security through the CSCE, a realpolitik balance of power or reliance 
on national defence”24. Yet the Euro-Atlantic orientation was domestically 
validated “with an impressive unanimity by the entire political elite” gathered 
for consultations at Snagov in 199325. If Romania had a range of international 
security options, why did the post-1992 official discourse construct Euro-
Atlantic accession as natural? NATO and EU membership provided the surest 
and fastest way in which Romania could receive international recognition for its 
desired Euro-Atlantic identity. The Western self would thus validate 
unequivocally that the Romanian other was part of the Euro-Atlantic 
community in both civilisational and institutional meanings. Among the 
different discursive facets of Romanian identity, the “European” self-image was 
deeply rooted in the foreign policy imaginary and was meant to show the 
country’s Western origins. Since the Euro-Atlantic self continued to construct 
candidate states (including Romania) as “liminal Europe” or “Europe but not 
quite Europe”26, the foreign policy imaginary needed to be re-defined in 
reaction to Western representations. 
In the 1990-1996 official discourses, Romania was very frequently 
depicted as a “European” state. This self-image started taking shape soon after 
the fall of the communist dictatorship, as the newly appointed Foreign Affairs 
Minister Adrian Năstase stated in the wake of Romania’s first free elections 
(May 1990) ‒ “[t]o my view, things are clear. Romania is a European state”27. 
President Iliescu also summed up what this identity meant for the country 
historically and in terms of values:  
 
 “[D]ue to its culture, civilisation and political tradition, Romania decidedly 
belongs to classical Europe, inheriting both the ancient Greek-Roman tradition and the 
modern principles of statehood – citizenship, freedom, fundamental human rights, the 
separation of powers within the state, the rule of law”28.  
 
                                                 
24
  Andrew Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 
1995, p. 13. 
25
  Andrei Miroiu, “National and International Security at the Dawn of the XXIst Century: The 
Romanian Case”, Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2002, p. 103. 
26
  Maria Mälksoo, The Politics of Becoming European. A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-
Cold War Security Imaginaries, Routledge, London, 2010, p. 57. 
27
  Adrian Năstase ‒ Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (June 1990-November 1992), 
“Interview for the Romanian National Radio” (Bucharest, 14 July 1990), in România după 
Malta. 875 de zile la Externe, vol. 1, Fundaţia Titulescu, București, 2006, p. 96. 
28
  Ion Iliescu, “We Need One Another, just like All of Us Need a United Europe, a Europe of 
the Nations” – Speech delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 3 
November 1994), in Toamna diplomatică/ The Autumn of Diplomacy, Redacţia 
publicaţiilor pentru străinătate, București, 1995, p. 94. 
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 When studying the evolution of Romania's post-communist foreign policy 
articulations, two recurring and interconnected themes become apparent ‒ recovering 
the “European” identity and “returning to Europe”, both politically and economically. 
This was definitely not a unique approach, as obtaining Euro-Atlantic membership 
was the general aspiration for Central and Eastern European states, while most of 
their leaders gradually incorporated in speeches the concept of “European identity”29. 
Despite the common theme, there were specific nuances and meanings associated 
with the overarching European identity in each state. In the Romanian case, the 
official discourse articulated several variations (“European”, “Western”, “Latin”), all 
of which were meant to dissociate the new state from its communist past and promote 
a shared identity with the West. The latter two are inextricably linked, if one takes into 
account the common ethnic, cultural and linguistic origins of the French, Spanish, 
Portuguese and Romanian peoples as descendants of the ancient Romans. The Latin 
identity of Romanians was portrayed as “an undeniable sign of our connection to the 
great family of Western European peoples”30. The state’s Western subjectivity and 
“return to Europe” were associated with key moments of European history: 
 
 “[T]he generation of 1848 and that of the Union [1918] linked the Romanians’ 
country to Western civilisation, extricating it from Oriental rule. The current generation 
of the Romanian nation will re-adopt that tradition”31 . 
 
 So the approximately fifty years of communism were seen as yet 
another period which had forcefully separated Romania from its Western family, 
or “a sort of parenthesis in the country’s historical destiny”32. 
In early 1991, a pivotal shift occurred in the foreign policy discourse, 
which attempted to distance Romania from its traditional “Eastern European” 
representation, moving towards that of “Central European”. The motivations 
behind the change in terminology could be attributed to the fact that “Eastern 
Europe” had acquired specific political and ideological connotations during the 
Cold War, primarily defining the Soviet Union’s satellite states33. It should be 
noted that the political entity of “Eastern Europe” had been created in the 
                                                 
29  Petr Drulák, “The Return of Identity to European Politics”, in Idem (ed.), National and 
European Identities in EU Enlargement: Views from Central and Eastern Europe, 
Institute of International Relations, Prague, 2001, pp. 11-20. 
30  Teodor Meleşcanu, “Romania Has Refused to Give Up Its European Identity even in the 
Context of Bipolar Confrontation” (Excerpts from Speeches of late 1995), in Renaşterea 
diplomaţiei româneşti, cit., p. 115. 
31
  Idem, “The Romanian Diplomacy’s Contribution to the Union of Principalities” (Focşani, 
24 January 1996), in Renaşterea diplomaţiei româneşti, cit., p. 23. 
32
  Ion Iliescu, “Interview for ‘Le Point”’ (2 April 1994), in Romania in Europe and in the 
World, The Foreign Languages Press Group, București, 1994, p. 184. 
33
  Christian-Radu Chereji, “The Concept of Central Europe in the 90s”, in Vasile Puşcaş 
(ed.), Central Europe since 1989. Concepts and Developments, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2000, 
pp. 13-14. 
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aftermath of the Yalta Conference (1945), where the United States, the Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdom discussed and controversially decided the 
reconfiguration of war-torn Europe. The concept of “Eastern Europe” was 
invented by Western Europe as its other half in the Enlightenment (eighteenth 
century), the imagined space where “European” civilisation encountered 
“Oriental” barbarism34. During the Cold War, NATO and the EU defined their 
eastern boundary as a defence line for “European unity”, which enabled them to 
construct a superior Western identity based on shared democratic values35. Or, 
to adapt the Orientalism of Edward Said, the Euro-Atlantic community 
developed a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority 
over” Eastern Europe36. Being articulated as part of “Eastern Europe” did not 
help the efforts of a state aspiring to form a shared identity with the West. 
Romania’s discursive responses were a combination of acceptance and 
resistance: accepting the authority of the Western European self yet refusing to 
be placed in the “East”. Therefore, the official discourse started describing 
Romania as “Central European”. The re-defined self-image became most 
obvious in foreign policy documents ‒ “[Romania’s] geopolitical location is that 
of a country belonging to Central Europe”37. In April 1992, the Romanian 
Foreign Affairs Minister defined “Central European” states to be all those 
forcefully placed behind the borders of the extended Soviet empire38.  
As the contemporary articulation and heir of “Mitteleuropa”, this notion 
of “Central Europe” was advocated by candidate states in the early stages of 
NATO and EU enlargement, trying to symbolise a stronger European 
subjectivity39. It had been first revived in February 1991 by three post-
communist states (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), in an attempt to stand 
out among fellow Euro-Atlantic aspirants. They formed the self-entitled 
“Visegrad Group”, which “reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central 
European region to work together in a number of fields of common interest 
within the all-European integration”40. Romania opposed the Visegrad Group’s 
discursive differentiation and exclusive appropriation of “Central Europe”. On 
19 June 1992, the Western European Union (WEU later incorporated into the 
                                                 
34
  Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the 
Enlightenment, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994, p. 5. 
35
  Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 
1995, p. 8. 
36
  Edward Said, Orientalism, Penguin Books, London, 2003, p. 3. 
37
  The White Chart of Romania’s Foreign Affairs Ministry (January 1991-May 1992), in 
Lumea, no. 25-26, 25 June 1992, p. 12. 
38
  Adrian Năstase, “A New Architecture for Central and Eastern Europe” (Geneva, 29 April 
1992), in România şi noua arhitectură mondială. Studii, Alocuţiuni, Interviuri 1990-1996, 
Asociaţia Română pentru Educaţie Democratică, București, 1996, p. 132.  
39
  Iver Neumann, Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999, pp. 236-237. 
40
  The Visegrad Group, About the Visegrad Group; http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about 
(April 2014).  
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EU) issued a statement in which it included all post-communist states as part of 
“Central Europe”41. Talking about the WEU declaration, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Năstase mentioned the importance of external validation and clarified 
what being “Central European” meant for Romania: 
 
 “I think that things are now better because this document  certifies our 
philosophy concerning the area where we are situated, so there can be no more 
discussions about a division between Central (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) and 
Eastern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria and, perhaps, the Baltic states). We 
have managed to express our view: the area between the former Soviet Union and 
Western Europe is a unitary zone, which is indivisible from the security perspective and 
must be treated as such [...] all these countries belong to Central Europe”42. 
 
The next years highlighted the articulation of different versions on the 
same “Central European” theme, which showed the fluid process of national 
identity formation and how the discourse did not crystallise a specific image. 
For example, according to President Iliescu, Romania “is an intrinsic part of the 
Central-European area”43; and since “the map of Europe” stretched “from the 
Atlantic to the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea”, Romania was located “not 
only in the centre of Europe, but even in the centre of Central Europe”44. 
Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu reinforced a similar line – “Romania is 
situated at an equal distance from the western and northern, as well as the 
eastern borders of Europe […] [it] is the second largest country in Central 
Europe after Poland”45. As argued in the conceptual outline of this article, 
national identity draws understandings from a stable ethno-cultural core that 
resonates with the nation’s ancestry and territory. That is why Romania had to 
position its identity with reference to the neighbouring region known as “the 
Balkans”, a task subjected to the impact of domestic and external discourses. 
 
 
 Romania’s Self-Image as “Non-Balkan” 
 
The second main self-image feeding into Romanian national identity 
derives from the state’s complex relationship with the Balkans. This self-image 
was part of a wider international context that shaped the Romanian foreign 
                                                 
41
  The Western European Union, Declaration after the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU 
Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe (Bonn, 19 June 2002); available within 
“Key Texts” at http://www.weu.int/ (April 2014). 
42
  Adrian Năstase, “Interview”, in Lumea, no. 25-26, 25 June 1992, p. 3.   
43
  Ion Iliescu, Revoluţie şi reformă, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1994, p. 264.  
44
  Ion Iliescu, “Address at the Crans-Montana Forum” (Bucharest, 21 April 1994), in 
Romania in Europe and in the World, cit., pp. 55-56. 
45  Teodor Meleşcanu, “Romania as a Security Provider” (Washington, 15-17 July 1996), in 
Renaşterea diplomaţiei româneşti, cit., p. 136. 
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policy imaginary, especially Western perceptions of the Yugoslav wars. In July 
1990, NATO invited the Central-Eastern European states (Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria) and the Soviet Union to 
create regular diplomatic relations with the Alliance. The North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) was founded in 1991 as another step in the 
institutionalised dialogue between NATO and the post-communist states. Since 
the Soviet Union disintegrated later that year, NACC became the suitable 
mechanism through which to enhance cooperation with Central-Eastern Europe. 
By the early 1990s, many post-communist states had expressed their wish to 
join NATO. Following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance faced an “identity 
crisis” and “had to reassess its strategic concept, its views of the types of war or 
hostilities it could expect to deter and fight and, more broadly, re-evaluate its 
role in international security and politics”46. Given this post-Cold War identity 
crisis, some argued that enlargement would provide NATO with a new purpose. 
Alliance expansion to newly democratic Central-Eastern Europe sparked a lot of 
debate and the first wave would eventually occur in 1999. Meanwhile, the EU 
was re-considering its identity as well. Post-1990 the supranational organisation 
had to decide whether it aimed to be something more than a “problem-solving 
entity” that only promoted the interests of its member states47. The collapse of 
communism confronted the EU with the opportunity to become a “value-based 
community”, which would extend its principles and form a common identity 
with Central-Eastern Europe48. At the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, 
the EU decided to enlarge and drafted a set of political and economic criteria 
that candidate states would have to fulfil to obtain membership. Yet both the EU and 
NATO proved to be unprepared to deal with what was happening in Yugoslavia. 
The Yugoslav Federation had six constituent republics: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. By 1990 
Yugoslavia was undergoing drastic transformations. Croatia and Slovenia 
declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, followed by Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1992. The Serbs living in these republics retaliated and were 
supported by Belgrade, leading to armed inter-ethnic conflicts. The timing of 
such outbreaks relates to the wider global context. When the international order 
maintaining a certain level of regional security disappears, individuals search 
for security in their national or ethnic identity49. The revolutions in communist 
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Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union helped to break down the 
dictatorial system ensuring a tentative stability in the Balkan area. Long-
standing inter-ethnic tensions resurfaced and turned into the Yugoslav wars of 
the early 1990s. Unfortunately, the “well established derogatory connotations” 
also re-emerged, as “the fighting precipitated by the break-up of Yugoslavia has 
probably left these more entrenched in the popular imagination than ever”; not 
only communism was “blamed for the mass violence, but ethnic diversity itself, 
and historical cleavages between religions and cultures”50. Nevertheless, the 
causes of the Yugoslav wars are complex and varied. One of them was the 
aspiration of Balkan peoples to create viable nation-states, which differed little 
from what the rest of Europe had experienced in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. Gale Stokes explained this process: 
 
 “[R]emapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the major threads of 
post-French Revolutionary European history. The process began with the unifications of 
Italy and Germany, ran through the creation of new states at the end of World War I, 
and had its most catastrophic outcomes [...] with the Holocaust and the [later] expulsion 
of the Germans from Eastern Europe […] [T]he wars of Yugoslav succession are not 
some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they are the last stages of a process of European 
redefinition that has been going on since the French revolution”51. 
 
Another cause of the Yugoslav wars referred to controversial figures 
like Slobodan Milošević, who manipulated national sentiments for their 
personal gains or for what they perceived to be the benefit of their ethnic group. 
Since Western political elites “struggled to make sense of an otherwise 
perplexing conflict”, simplistic accounts of the Yugoslav wars became 
increasingly appealing52. These explanations were rooted in negative 
stereotypes of “the Balkans”, which had been articulated as “Balkan ghosts, 
ancient Balkan enmities, primordial Balkan cultural patterns and proverbial 
Balkan turmoil”53. The negative imagery of “the Balkans” dated back to the 
early 1900s and gradually intensified to the point that even World War II was 
seen as the Balkans’ fault54. For example, the journalist Robert Kaplan said that 
‒ “Nazism [...] can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a 
breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler 
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learned how to hate so infectiously”55. In the case of the Yugoslav wars, such 
pejorative stereotypes and derogatory remarks proliferated. Ioan M. Paşcu 
regretfully noted that: 
 
 “The conflict is usually viewed as another irrefutable instance of the perpetual 
violence and proverbial lack of civilization characterizing a region incapable of 
overcoming its traditional condition as Europe’s powder keg. In today’s vocabulary, 
these terms imply a judgement that Balkan peoples exhibit a total incapacity to learn 
and practice democracy and market economy”56. 
 
 As State Secretary in the Ministry of National Defence, Paşcu 
elaborated upon Romania’s stance on the Yugoslav wars in 1994: 
 
 “Romania’s official position with regard to the Yugoslav conflict has three 
major components. First, we hold the view that the only viable solution is to be reached 
by the parties which are directly involved. Regardless how impatient the outside world 
might become – and for good reason – its main mission would be to create conditions 
for bringing the parties to the negotiating table and to facilitate their agreement. 
External efforts aimed at finding a solution to the conflict should not be viewed, in 
other words, as a substitute for an accord between protagonists [...] Second, Romania 
has firmly abstained from any military involvement in the conflict [...] Third, Romania 
has declared that she is disposed to explore diplomatic solutions to Yugoslav wars. 
Romania is thus materializing her uncontested advantages (lack of any interest in the 
conflict itself, good relations with practically all former Yugoslav republics, and a 
relatively correct understanding of the situation, given her knowledge of the Balkan 
region)”57. 
 
 The Yugoslav wars and their connection to “the Balkans” impacted on 
the Romanian foreign policy imaginary and a key self-image of national identity 
‒ Romania as “non-Balkan”.  
Romania’s discursive relationship with “the Balkans” has been an interesting 
combination of rejection and acceptance. Foreign policy decision-makers put great 
effort into explaining that Romania was not part of the Balkans, particularly to 
international audiences58. They promoted instead the subjectivity of a Central 
European state neighbouring or “in immediate proximity” to that region59. Similarly 
to the “Eastern European” articulation, Romania’s post-communist national identity 
was dissociated from representations like “Oriental”, “Byzantine” or “Balkan”, which 
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illustrated “biased” and “bad faithed” categorisations with the intent of “stigmatizing 
the perspectives of our [democratic] evolution”60. In October 1993, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Meleşcanu argued that not only geography constituted Romania as a “non-
Balkan” state – “[w]e Romanians prefer to describe ourselves as a Central European 
country close to the Balkans […] Romania, being located north of the Danube, does 
not belong geographically to the Balkan region”; since a “country belongs to the area 
where its problems lie”, Romania’s “well-known” good relations with “any Balkan or 
successor states in the former Yugoslavia” lead to the conclusion that Romania cannot 
be Balkan61. Within the same context, Meleşcanu went on to add: “[T]his clarification 
might help our friends to the south to understand that the way we characterize 
Romania implies neither a denial of enduring economic, political and cultural ties, nor 
a diminution of the important Balkan dimension of our foreign policy”62. In the light 
of such constructs, Romania shaped its national identity to be different from two 
significant others – “Eastern” and “Balkan”. Like the underlying Orientalism of 
Western narratives, Balkanism explores a more geographically specific but equally 
problematic and negative representation of “otherness”. Maria Todorova aptly 
concludes in this respect: “[A]s in the case of the Orient, the Balkans have served as a 
repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory 
image of the ‘European’ and the ‘West’ has been constructed”.63. The urgency of 
Romanian efforts to dissociate national identity from the label “Balkan” was related to 
international Western debates about the “Balkan” character and the Yugoslav wars, 
which abounded in negative stereotypes. A key text of this Balkanist pejorative 
discourse, influential in the West, was Kaplan’s “Balkan Ghosts” based on his travels 
in several countries including Romania. For Kaplan and his growing number of 
readers, Romania was emphatically “Balkan”. 
Upon closer examination of the Romanian foreign policy discourses, 
the self-image of “non-Balkan” coexisted with articulations like “our friends to 
the south”. The long-time “friend” in the region was Yugoslavia, whether in its 
past political form or contemporary individual entities. President Iliescu 
clarified and reinforced those understandings:  
 
 “[W]e have a good tradition in terms of relations with Yugoslavia. We could 
even say that Yugoslavia was our best neighbour, the history of our relations having 
never known any conflict. We had permanent communication and supported each other; 
a solidarity based on common history was created. We are very sensitive from that point 
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of view. The Romanian people show a certain solidarity and a feeling of frustration 
because of this tragedy64 affecting a heroic people with a rather tumultuous past”65.  
 
 The representations of Balkan states as “friends”, “best neighbour”, two 
mentions of “solidarity” in quick succession and “common history” suggest that 
Romania’s national identity was not constructed by applying a mutually 
exclusive and hostile relationship of otherness vis-à-vis the Balkans. Romanian 
identity was defined as “non-Balkan”, yet retained a Balkan affinity and 
traditional friendly rapport with the Balkans. Once Romania was accepted as an 
EU and NATO candidate, its official discourses gradually encountered external 
sources that promoted different articulations about Romanian identity. It is 
essential to remember that national identity formation involves both self-
projection and external recognition. In other words, Romanian discursive 
attempts to portray the state as “non-Balkan” would be unsuccessful without 
Western validation. So, even though Romanian political leaders sought to 
dissociate their state from “the Balkans” by invoking geographic, historical and 
cultural arguments, their representation was partially supported by international 
narratives. Many external audiences did not seem inclined to differentiate 
between Romania and the Balkan region. Their influence needed to be 
accommodated by national discourses, shaping modified meanings for 
Romanian identity. From 1994 onwards, Romania was often depicted as 
“marking the border of different, even divergent, areas of civilization: Central, 
but also South-Eastern Europe”66. Apart from the “European” and “non-Balkan” 
self-images, Romanian national identity had historically resonated with the idea 
of being a “security provider”. The latter construct relates to the second factor 
shaping national identity from within – collective memory-myths and how 
interpretations of the past are invoked to legitimate images in the present. 
 
 
 Romania’s Self-Image as a “Security Provider” 
 
The third discursive theme of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary is 
that of “security provider”. The post-1992 Romanian discourse showed a range 
of interconnected articulations – “security provider”, “source of stability”, 
“reliable partner”. Romanian elites often explicitly mentioned or suggested their 
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state’s contribution to generating stability among its troubled neighbours. For 
instance, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu stressed the following:  
 
 “[Romania’s] internal stability and responsible, predictable international 
conduct have so far made it possible to physically separate two areas of open or latent 
conflict. The mutual reinforcement of the eastern and the southern ‘arcs of crises’ has 
been prevented. Had this not happened, the problems currently confronting the 
European Union, NATO and the WEU [Western European Union] would have been 
considerably greater, perhaps even unsolvable”67. 
  
 President Iliescu said on several occasions that “we are deeply 
concerned with the tragic developments in the former Yugoslavia” and that 
Romania, “situated in the immediate vicinity to areas with high possibility for 
conflict”, can play an important role in ensuring regional security68. Even 
though variations on this theme also circulated in the foreign policy imaginary 
pre-1992, Romania’s official discourse indicated a notable emphasis on the 
“security provider” self-image after November 1992 when Meleşcanu came into 
office. He insisted on depicting Romania as a “security generator” that could 
export democratic stability to the Balkans. Such external efforts would be 
supported by the “unbiased” and “traditional good relations” with former 
Yugoslav states: 
 
 “[W]hether it is openly admitted or not, Romania has been perceived more 
and more by all its southern neighbours as a factor of stability for the Balkans […] 
Romania does not intend to comfortably position itself as mere beneficiary of the 
security arrangements in Europe. Commensurate with our resources, military capability 
and comparative advantages in terms of strategic position and infrastructure facilities at 
Romania’s disposal, we are also able and willing to play the role of security 
generator”69. 
 
Meleşcanu had an important role in configuring this self-image and 
appeared to be the most emphatic about it in 1993-1996. His professional 
background as a long-time diplomat brought another type of elite perspective on 
Romanian national identity and external relations. Unlike President Iliescu, who 
was generally perceived to have a strong affinity towards Russia (due to his 
education in Moscow and especially due to the 1991 Soviet “Friendship 
Treaty”), Meleşcanu had been socialised in a different and more “Western”-
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oriented setting. He had attended postgraduate courses in International Relations 
and earned a PhD in International Law at the University of Geneva during 
1966-197370, where he was exposed to several ideas that affected the future 
Minister’s interpretation of the Romanian and international imaginaries. 
Meleşcanu’s studies influenced him as a foreign policy practitioner who 
distinctly reinforced Romania’s chosen European and Euro-Atlantic direction. 
Being a firm advocate of it, the Foreign Affairs Minister elaborated on the 
“security provider” self-image (as opposed to consumer) in the context of 
NATO accession: 
 
 “Romania does not intend to simply be positioned at the receiving end of 
European security arrangements, instead wishing to play a role of security provider. The 
fact that Romania is considered a factor of stability in its geographical area speaks for 
itself in this respect. The political stability of Romania, its balanced, responsible and 
predictable international behaviour recommend it as an asset for NATO”71.   
 
 These speeches were delivered in London and Washington, where the 
intended audiences were highly influential Alliance members. Romania, just 
like the other post-communist candidate states, needed to highlight and 
convince NATO decision-makers that it could contribute to allied capabilities. 
A purely rational account would argue that Romanian officials created the 
representation of “security provider”, in order to alleviate NATO’s concerns 
about Romania becoming a potential net consumer of security once given 
membership. Yet the evidence shows that there is more to the story of foreign 
policy than mere cost-benefit calculations. This is particularly relevant in the 
Romanian case, where deeply ingrained meanings about national identity 
shaped the state’s main self-images and international behaviour. 
Thus, the construct of “security provider” did not simply emerge as a 
response to NATO requirements. Its ideational roots were closely linked to a 
long-standing collective memory-myth of Romania as defender of Europe and 
the West, which features prominently in the Romanian imaginary. As 
previously discussed, collective memory-myths are a domestic source of 
national identity formation, a source from which elites draw understandings 
about the state’s self-images. They also constitute subjective interpretations 
regarding the nation’s remembered past. When talking about the construction of 
Romanian “uniqueness” or exceptionalism in historiography, Anca Băicoianu 
distinguishes three major coordinates – geographic, historical and cultural. 
Geographically, Romania occupied the strategic position of a “turning point” 
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between the East and the West, as well as a necessary “defence line against all 
invasions”72. Second, the historical coordinate obsessively portrayed the “heroic 
and civilizing” double descent (Dacian and Roman), which was invoked to 
“claim superiority over the closest neighbours and to legitimate Romania's place 
as a rightful member of the European choir of nations”73. Third, culturally 
speaking, “the ever increasing feeling of isolation” turned “the idea of 
uniqueness into a true framework of Romanian identity”; unable to find a 
suitable pace and constantly fearing exclusion from an ideally imagined 
Western Europe, Romanian culture “struggles to achieve a however fragile 
balance between its specificity and a longing for integration”74. The collective 
memory-myth of Romanian exceptionalism, its articulation as defender of the 
West and stronghold protecting European civilisation against invading 
foreigners, was sometimes openly expressed in the foreign policy texts: 
“[S]ituated in Central Europe, Romania has certainly been central to Europe. 
For centuries, the Romanian countries were the bastions of European 
civilisation, independence and freedom”75. 
The above quote is a good example of how the Romanian past has been 
dramatised under the “remarkable functionality” of the myth of the struggle for 
independence76. In this respect, Lucian Boia explains how the “pressure of 
foreigners from outside and from within, real up to a point but hyperbolized in 
the national imaginary, generated the besieged fortress complex which is so 
typical of the Romanian mentality of the last two centuries”77. Such inter-
connected collective memory-myths hold a triple purpose: “Highlighting the 
virtue and heroism of the Romanians, justifying their historical late-coming in 
terms of the sacrifices imposed by ceaseless aggression, and, finally, attracting 
the attention of the West to its debt of gratitude towards the Romanians who 
defended it from the Ottoman onslaught”78. So the “security provider” self-
image had a solid and older ideational foundation to be built upon, resonating 
with Romanian understandings of the nation’s past. It drew on a historical 
reference point to mould and guide one of the main facets of Romania’s post-
communist national identity and foreign policy role. As Boia concludes,  
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 “[T]he image of a West protected thanks to Romania’s sacrifice and a 
Romanian society strained and held back by fulfilling the function of defender of the 
European civilization has become deeply ingrained in the political vision of the 
Romanians, in their behavior and their reactions”79. 
 
In conclusion, this article has argued for a re-thinking of Romania’s 
foreign policy within an identity puzzle. It put forward an inter-disciplinary 
perspective on national identity derived from the combined insights of 
constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and international 
recognition. At its fundamental level, national identity is a two-way social 
construct that encompasses both a domestic and an international component. 
The internal sources of national identity refer to the nation and collective 
memory-myths or interpretations of the nation’s past. The external dimension of 
national identity is about a state’s self-images being recognised or accepted by 
salient others in the international arena. Such a multi-faceted view of national 
identity becomes particularly relevant for the period 1990-1996, when the 
Romanian foreign policy imaginary crystallised three main themes: “European”, 
“non-Balkan” and “security provider”. These self-images have been intensely 
re-articulated between 1990 and 1996 under the internal and external dynamic 
of national identity formation, configuring a rich palette of meanings for 
Romania’s post-communist foreign policy. 
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